Peran Bimbingan dan Konseling dalam Menangkal Informasi Bohong: Tinjauan Faktor Kognitif Peserta Didik
Abstract
Perkembangan teknologi dan informasi memudahkan kita untuk mencari dan memperoleh informasi menggunakan internet dan sosial media. Mudahnya mengakses informasi juga diiringi dengan banyaknya informasi yang beredar, sehingga menimbulkan kesulitan untuk membedakan informasi yang benar dengan informasi bohong. Informasi bohong adalah informasi yang sengaja disampaikan dengan salah karena tidak sesuai dengan fakta dan realitas. Informasi bohong menjauhkan seseorang dari kebenaran dan menyebabkan masalah bagi indivdu yang menggunakannya untuk pengambilan keputusan. Besarnya dampak dari informasi bohong mendorong ditulisnya artikel ini menggunakan studi kepustakaan dengan mengulas dan menganalisis interaksi berbagai faktor yang mempengaruhi percayanya seseorang pada informasi bohong dan peran lingkungan pendidikan untuk mengatasinya. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahwa kerentanan terhadap informasi bohong disebabkan bebrapa faktor seperti kepercayaan epistemic yang naïf; pengulangan yang meningkatkan familiaritas dan persepsi kebenaran; bias informasi individu yang sesuai dengan keyakinannya. Artikel ini diharapkan dapat menjadi rujukan bagi guru BK untuk mengembangkan layanan berbasis literasi informasi, bimbingan kelompok mengenai bias kognitif, dan layanan responsif bagi siswa yang terdampak informasi bohong.
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